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Abstract
Purpose – This research analyzes to what extent committing resources
to the internationalization of family business groups is related to the
institutional distance of the host country.
Design/methodology/approach – We used OLS panel data with
fixed effects.
Findings – We identified that family business groups decide to
internationalize themselves committing fewer resources to countries
that present a positive institutional distance, and that are more
institutionally developed than the country of origin. On the other hand,
when family business groups choose to expand abroad committing more
resources, they tend to invest in countries with a negative institutional
distance, and that are less institutionally developed than the country
of origin.
Originality/value – Our main contribution to existing theory on
internationalization of family business groups is to test the relationship
between the level of resource commitment by family business groups
in their international expansion and the institutional distance between
the country of origin and the host country.
Keywords – Family business groups; internationalization; resource
commitment; institutional distance.
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1 Introduction
This article analyzes to what extent the
commitment of resources in the internationalization
process of a family business group is associated to
the host country’s institutional distance. Previous
studies indicated a number of advantages and
disadvantages in the internationalization of family
business groups. Among the disadvantages is
the fact that family business groups have rooted
within their affiliates institutional characteristics
that are specific to their home country, thus
hindering their adaptation when there is
internationalization to countries with different
institutional characteristics (Pedersen & Stucchi,
2015). Regarding advantages, we can highlight
the fact that being affiliated to a group is a way
of overcoming institutional weaknesses such as
fragile regulations, breakdowns in infrastructure
and a failure to fulfill contracts. Group-affiliated
firms benefit from financial support and from
information for the internationalization process,
while also making use of family business groups’
influence on the government of the country of
origin (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Yaprak &
Karademir, 2010). Furthermore, there is evidence
that family business groups internationalize more
quickly than non-affiliated firms, expanding to
a higher number of countries, and their entry
generally involves greater resources (Yaprak &
Karademir, 2010). However, there is a lack of
definitive evidence concerning the decisionmaking process regarding resource commitment,
or whether this decision is associated to the
institutional level of the host country, since
institutions play a relevant role in the establishment
and development of family business groups.
As such, this article seeks to contribute to
existing theory on the internationalization of
family business groups, testing if the choice for
greater or lesser resource commitment in the
internationalization of affiliated firms is associated
to the institutional distance between the country
of origin and the host country.

Considering that the development of
firms depends on the business environment to
which they belong (Williamson, 1981), we can
understand the growth of family business groups
from an institutional perspective. In order to
reduce transactions costs in markets with weak
institutions, groups diversify and integrate
vertically. As well as performing transactions
amongst themselves, these integrated firms are
able to overcome fragile institutional contexts
by doing so (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 1999;
Yiu, Lu, Bruton, & Hoskisson, 2007). Thus,
the creation of this intragroup market provides
support to affiliated firms during their expansion
into different countries, regardless of their
institutional distances. The term “institutional
distance” designates a difference or similarity
between home and host countries in terms of
institutional environments (Kostova, 1999).
Measuring institutional difference is important to
understanding the type of entry mode strategies
that can be matched to such distance, so as to
ensure firms abroad have a competitive edge
(Hernandez & Nieto, 2015).
For this analysis, we used Brazil as the
research sample. Brazil was chosen due to
its expressive representativeness in terms of
family business groups; the 200 biggest groups
represented 52.6% of the Gross Domestic
Product in 2012. Also, being a country with
weak institutions, family business groups use this
“disadvantage” to grow and diversify. Moreover,
Brazil holds an average ranking position according
to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI),
which increases the possibility of its comparison
with other nations on that list. As such, the
annual ranking from Valor 200 Grandes Grupos
was used to compose a sample of 38 groups
with international operations. Using these 38
family business groups as a starting point, about
500 affiliated firms were located abroad. These
subsidiaries were used in a hypothesis test through
panel data and fixed effects regression.
Results show that decisions by family
business groups, in terms of resource commitment
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to internationalize, are associated to the
institutional distance of the host country. Based
on the assumption that the degree of resource
commitment comes prior to the choice of a
host country, family business groups tend to
internationalize with less resource commitment
– herein considered a commercial office – to
countries that are more developed than the
home country. However, when they choose to
internationalize with higher resource commitment
– in this study referring to a manufacturing plant
– family business groups choose countries that are
less developed than their home countries.

2 Theoretical foundation
2.1 Family Business Groups
Family business groups are a specific
organizational form (Khanna; Yafeh, 2007) and,
despite being part of developed markets, as is the
case of Italy and Sweden (Chang, 2006; Khanna
& Yafeh, 2007), they dominate private sector
activities in the majority of emerging markets
around the world (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).
These groups are given different names in different
countries. In South Korea, for example, they
are called cheabols; in Japan, keiretsu; in South
America, grupos económicos; and, in Russia,
oligarchs (Granovetter, 1994). So far, there is no
clear consensus in literature about the definition
of family business groups (Cuervo-Cazurra,
2006; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Definitions
vary from country to country, but the most usual
definitions are the following: (i) in a broader
approach adopted by Sociology, business groups
are a series of firms that are formally or informally
connected to each other (Granovetter, 1994); (ii)
the other approach, referring to Economics, is
more specific and suggests that family business
groups are a collection of formally independent
firms, although their administrative and financial
aspects are often jointly controlled, and often
by a family (Chang & Hong, 2002). Lastly, the
definition used in this article is the one suggested
by Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) and Khanna

and Palepu (1997), in which business groups are
legally independent firms, under family control,
that operate through a range of industries and,
mostly in emerging markets (Ghemawat &
Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 1997).
In regards to organizational structure,
family business groups vary greatly. Some are
diversified, while others are more vertically
integrated (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). According
to Schneider (2009), family business groups
diversify so as to improve economic return
through an economy of scope and also to reduce
the risk of managerial volatility. For example,
the average of sectors to which Chilean groups
belong is around 5.6. In India, they belong to
4.2 sectors, and, in the Philippines, 3.5 sectors
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). Additionally, a recent
study showed that, in Brazil, diversification of
family business groups is at around 4 sectors per
group (Costa, Bandeira-de-Mello, & Marcon,
2013). Concerning vertical integration, there are
groups that belong to different and correlated
industries. For example, family business groups
that operate in the agricultural sector have an
office that trades agricultural products. Vertical
integration also varies among countries. For
example, Philippine groups are more vertical than
Indian groups, which, in turn, are more vertical
that Mexican groups (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007).
In respect to ownership and control, there are
vertically controlled groups – pyramidal, and
the horizontally controlled (Khanna & Yafeh,
2007). Essentially, family business groups are
pyramidal (La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, & Shleifer,
1999; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Morck
& Yeung, 2003) and, by means of the pyramid
structure, the firm directly and indirectly controls
the affiliated firms. Through this, families always
control the vote in all group firms, even when
they do not necessarily own them (Morck &
Yeung, 2003).
It is possible to understand the expansion
of family business groups through Transaction
Cost Theory (Williamson, 1981). This theory
suggests that development of the firm depends
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on the institutional environment in which it
is inserted. When institutional failure occurs,
a transaction economically profitable to both
parts is not established, since the costs of each
transaction outweigh the benefits (Williamson,
1981). Transaction costs are high because rules
are not followed; there are imperfect contracts
and legislations, when compared to transactions
costs in developed countries (Khanna & Palepu,
1997; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). For example,
in emerging markets, the financial sector is
characterized by limited transparency, weak
corporate governance, and control. Financial
funds, business analysts and venture capital, the
intermediaries, are not always involved in the
processes. Moreover, regulation has not been fully
developed or is not strong enough to ensure that
rules are obeyed (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).
As proposed in the definition, business
groups are normally family-ruled and usually
developed in markets with high transaction
costs (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000).
A reduction of transaction costs is possible due
to the fact that groups diversify, so they can do
better business among the group-affiliated firms
and overcome the fragile institutional context
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 1999; Yiu et al.,
2007). As a result of the previously presented
weak conjectures and internal transactions, family
business groups create capital, production and
work markets within the group. For example,
many family groups have their own banks,
performing transactions with affiliated firms, as
Banco Original, part of Grupo JHS&F, or Banco
Moneo, part of Marcopolo. Another example is
uncovered in the job market, in which groups
seek to exchange their professionals among
the different affiliated firms, instead of hiring
someone from the market. In this sense, Hyundai
business group developed a technical training
process and a research institute to be used by all
group-affiliated firms, thereby permitting the use
of the same professional in different group firms
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2007).

The establishment of an internal market,
within the family business group, provides
support to affiliate firms, both in their expansion
in the domestic market, described in the
previous paragraph, and in terms of international
expansion. Regarding the international expansion,
there are both disadvantages and advantages
associated to group-affiliated firms (Pedersen
& Stucchi, 2015; Yaprak & Karademir, 2010).
The disadvantages are related to the fact that
the group carries deeply rooted traits that are
specific to their home country. Affiliated firms
incorporate the characteristics of emerging
markets (wherein groups are more common) and,
internally, face aspects such as protectionism,
inefficiency, and bureaucracy. Furthermore, as
affiliates usually enjoy a favorable position in
the internal market, this may discourage their
drive for internationalization, as they may not
attain a similar position in the international
market (Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015). As such, the
institutional characteristics of the home country
may act as a demotivating factor in terms of the
internationalization of group-affiliated firms.
Furthermore, the advantages are related
to the fact that family business groups are able
to deal with the institutional breakdowns of
home countries and, through this, have more
experience in dealing with unstable institutional
environments. In this regard, being part of a
family business group provides the affiliate firm an
advantage in comparison to all the other domestic
firms, not only in contact with suppliers and
distributors, but also due to the fact that family
business groups have close ties to governmental
agencies (Yaprak & Karademir, 2010). These
groups have the power to influence politicians and
may generate regulatory distortions for their own
benefit (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998). BeckerRitterspach and Bruche (2012) highlighted the
central role of affiliation as a way to access internal
and external resources and to develop capacities
for the creation of internationally exploitable
assets. In the case of groups that originate from
emerging economies, Lin (2014) highlights the
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relevance of their contacts with external markets.
These contacts facilitate international expansion
for affiliates, if compared to unaffiliated firms
(Lamin, 2013). Moreover, sharing information
and experiences stimulates learning and imitation
among group firms and reduces uncertainty when
it comes to unexplored markets (Borda-Reyes,
2012).
Thus, the support provided by the family
business group in the internationalization of its
affiliated firms, motivate them to internationalize
faster, into a wider range of countries and
with greater resource commitment, when
compared to unaffiliated firms (Yaprak &
Karademir, 2010). However, when institutional
changes occur in the home country, the speed
of the internationalization process may be
negatively affected (Kumar, Stucchi, & Kundu,
2012), that is, institutional factors directly
impact the internationalization of affiliated
firms. Regarding the commitment of resources
, firms affiliated to a family business group tend to
invest more resources in the home country than
unaffiliated firms (Yaprak & Karademir, 2010).
However, so far there is no accurate evidence
about whether the existing difference between
the institutional development of the host and
the home country affects the commitment of
resources of affiliated firms. Therefore, this is the
theoretical gap that this article seeks to fill.

2.2 Host country selection based on
institutional distance
According to institutional theory, the
external context is responsible for dictating the
rules of the game (North, 1990). The mechanisms
that ensure compliance with these rules are the
legislative, executive and judicial institutions,
along with bureaucratic government issues, not to
mention the obligation of fulfilling contracts and
laws (Williamson, 2000). Through institutions it
is possible to do business, secure agreements and
resolve problems more efficiently. Institutions
are composed of formal and informal rules.
The formal rules are laws, the constitution and

regulations. The informal rules are linked to
people’s behavior, such as, for example, habits
not specified accurately in the rules and laws
(North, 1990). High quality institutions are
necessary to economic growth, as they facilitate
efficient operations among individuals and firms.
In particular, institutional efficiency is a result of
the coherent execution of regulations (La Porta
et al., 1999) and tends to promote the firm’s good
performance and export growth rates (LiPuma,
Newbert, & Doh, 2013). In emerging markets,
however, institutions are often weak, of poor quality
and subject to legal, political, governmental, social
and cultural, technological and security issues.
As such, the domestic environment makes firms
more selective when choosing their host countries
(Mishra & Daly, 2007). Thus, institutional
differences may influence the objective of firms’
internationalization (Moore, Payne, Bell, &
Davis, 2015), as well as the entry mode in the new
markets (Xu & Shenkar, 2002), the adoption of
policies and practices (Kostova & Roth, 2002) and
their performance (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997).
One way to assess institutional differences
is the institutional distance, which evaluates the
differences or similarities between the home and
the host country in terms of their institutional
environments (Kostova, 1999). Generically
speaking, institutional difference is the individual
and collective difference among regulatory,
normative and cognitive aspects of the home and
host countries (Moore et al., 2015). Estimating
this distance is important, as it permits to
understand which entry mode strategy can be
matched to the institutional distance, so as to
guarantee a competitive edge to firms abroad
(Hernandez & Nieto, 2015). Furthermore,
through this measure, it is possible to analyze
firms’ level of complexity in emerging markets, as
institutions are usually weaker and more complex
in said markets (Moore et al., 2015). In this sense,
there is evidence that the greater the institutional
distance, the more difficulty the foreign subsidiary
will face in instituting legitimacy and transferring
routines to its headquarters (Kostova & Zaheer,
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1999). Xu and Shenkar (2002) proposed that
multinationals choose less control over their
subsidiaries abroad when the environment of
the host country presents an institutional system
that is very different from the home country,
though they do choose majority control when
the institutional system is similar. Another study
showed that the probability of an investment in
a greenfield-type expansion increases when the
regulatory distance between countries is greater
(Ionascu, Meyer, & Erstin, 2004). Thus, a larger
institutional distance would discourage the entry
of external capital, but the detrimental effect is
mitigated if the host country holds substantial
resources (Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013).
Hernandéz and Nieto (2015) showed that
institutional distance has directions: negative
distance, when a subsidiary is installed in a
country with institutions that are worse than the
home country; and positive distance, when the
subsidiary is established in a country with better
regulatory institutions than the home country.
Thus, internationalization for countries with lower
regulatory development levels is related to entry
modes that require lesser resource development.
Entry into countries with more elevated levels
of regulatory development is related to the entry
modes that calls for greater resource commitment
(Hernandez & Nieto, 2015). Therefore, we
suggest that the direction of institutional
distance is important when deciding on resource
commitment in international expansion. However,
when the subsidiary of a multinational is affiliated
to a family business group, what happens in
relation to the commitment of resources and
institutional distance? The previous studies did
not show evidence of how family business groups
internationalize in terms of institutional distance.
It is important to note that
institutional issues may be determinant to the
internationalization of family business groups,
once affiliated firms incorporate the institutional
characteristics of emerging markets. This may
lead to a certain amount of difficulty in adapting
to foreign markets, in the case of expanding into
developed markets (Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015).
Additionally, the fact that family business groups

are able to cope with the institutional flaws of the
home country means they have more experience in
dealing with unstable institutional environments
(Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015). Furthermore, there
is evidence that family business groups influence
national policy for their own benefit (Ghemawat
& Khanna, 1998; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Thus,
we propose that family business groups choose
to commit more resources in countries with a
negative institutional distance, as they have more
experience in dealing with volatile institutional
environments, similar to those in their home
countries. Consequently, family business groups
will commit fewer resources in countries with a
positive institutional distance, that is, countries
that are more institutionally developed, since
their affiliates incorporate the characteristics of
the domestic market and face difficulty in dealing
with more developed markets.
Thus, we understood that the choice
of the host country in terms of institutional
distance is relevant to the internationalization
of family business groups. What antecedes this
choice is the level of resource commitment
that the group-affiliated firm will hold in its
international expansion, which may be in the
form of a commercial office, meaning low resource
commitment, or even a manufacturing plant,
meaning high resource commitment.

2.3 Hypothesis development
Family business groups are more common
in emerging markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).
They develop and grow due to the institutional
flaws of the home country (Khanna & Palepu,
2000a) and transact among group-affiliated firms,
whenever this is most advantages in terms of
transactions costs (Williamson, 1981). Affiliated
firms internationalize with advantages in relation
to unaffiliated firms, as they receive support from
the connections the family business group has with
governments, banks and institutions (Pedersen &
Stucchi, 2015). In addition, as institutions play a
relevant role in the establishment and development
of family business groups; affiliated firms are
marked by the institutional characteristics of the
home country, such as, for example, protectionism,
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inefficiency and bureaucracy. All the same, as they
occupy a favorable position within the market,
they may be less motivated to internationalize
to countries very different in institutional terms
(Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015). Therefore, it is
proposed that family business groups choose to
internationalize to institutionally more distant
countries with less resource commitment as a way
to learn about that institutional environment.
However, through this approach they become less
exposed to risk by committing resources, as they
do not develop sufficient skills to deal with more
developed institutional environments. In this
way, the group faces greater difficulty in making
connections with governments, gaining access to
financing and forming relationships with local
institutions, as they differ greatly to the reality of
the home country. Thus, we propose the following
hypothesis
H1: A lower degree of resource commitment
in the internationalization of a family
business group is positively associated to the
institutional distance between home and
host countries.
As the institutional issue is relevant in
the configuration and growth of family business
groups, the firms affiliated to these groups deal
with a financial sector lacking transparency, with

the regulation of underdeveloped countries, with
weak commitment to fulfilling contracts and
failure to comply with local laws (Khanna &
Palepu, 2000a). As a result, a weak institutional
context induces family business groups to
create a market within the actual group, grow
and diversify in environments with inadequate
institutional development. Being part of a family
business group thus creates a competitive edge
for the affiliate firm, as the groups usually have
an influence on policy and are proficient in
dealing with volatile institutional environments.
As such, we propose that family business groups
chose to internationalize with greater resource
commitment to countries with a negative
institutional distance in relation to home
countries, that is, to less institutionally developed
countries, as they find it easier to deal with the
institutions of that country, seeing as though they
already do so efficiently in their home countries.
Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2: A higher degree of resource commitment
in the internationalization of a family
business group is negatively associated to the
institutional distance between home and
host countries.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between
the variables proposed in hypotheses 1 and 2.

Figure 1: Model of the relationship among variables
Source: authors.
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3 Methods
3.1 Data
Collecting data on family business group
internationalization to test our hypothesis was
a major challenge in Brazil, as the information
on business group affiliated firms is difficult to
obtain. In this article, data was collected through
multiple sources, in order to guarantee access to
the volume and quality necessary to test models on
an unprecedented longitudinal database, thereby
constructing a panel database. A longitudinal of
data offers better estimators, as it provides insight
on how the phenomenon behaves over time. Also,
firms tend to internationalize year after year (often
with more than one international expansion per
year) and, thus, longitudinal data can offer better
explanations to the proposed models.
Regarding the data of Brazilian family
business groups, we collected through Valor
Grande Grupos. Data was captured from the
2001 to 2011 editions, a period that historically
represents an intensive internationalization
process among Brazilian firms, due to a series of
promarket reforms and favorable international
conditions. The publication ranks the top 200
Brazilian business groups. The group’s gross
earnings are used for the rank selection format.
Valor Grandes Groups is an annual publication
available on the newspaper Valor Econômico,
Brazil’s leading periodical on business and finance.
Information gathered from Valor Grandes Grupos
has previously been used in other academic studies
(Aldrighi & Postali, 2010; Costa et al., 2013;
Xavier, Marcon, & Bandeira-de-Mello, 2013).
Data showed that, among the top 200 Brazilian
business groups, only 38 run foreign operations.
In the period from 2001 to 2011, these 38
internationalized family business groups were
responsible for establishing 541 affiliated firms
abroad, in over 50 different countries.
Besides the annual publication of Valor
Grandes Grupos, the sample was selected from
a collection of secondary data sources. Among
these sources are: (i) Orbis Database – through
which it was possible to access each group and
verify their international activities (whether they

ran foreign operations and information about
the international subsidiary); (ii) the websites
of each family business group – from where
we gathered information regarding the group’s
history and decisions on internationalization
(iii) Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) – A
World Bank database, providing information on
the institutional development of the countries
analyzed. It is important to note that researchers
from different fields, such as Economics, Political
and Social Sciences, have diverging philosophies
and concepts regarding the institutional
environment and, as such, they attribute different
values to the range of components that form the
concept of institutions (Mudambi & Navarra,
2002). In this study, we used the governance
indicators obtained from Worldwide Governance
Indicators to show the institutional development
of a country. In total, there are six key dimensions
of governance published each year through WGI
for a list of 215 countries, and which will be
explained further on. Finally, the last data source
was (v) Economatica – which provided information
about diversification, accounting and financial
information. The final sample is comprised of 361
observations, approximately 33 groups per year,
given that some groups may have formed after
2001 or terminated their operations prior to 2011.
As each group likely has more than one affiliated
form abroad per year, this explains the reasons
why the number of observations is less than the
number of foreign affiliated firms. The idea was to
quantify the structure of family business groups in
the host country, by the number of foreign affiliated
firms and the type of foreign affiliated form –
manufacture, financial institution, distribution
centers and commercial offices. Thus, the study’s
unit of analysis is the group and its structure and
not the subsidiary alone.

3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Dependent variable
This article considers the institutional
distance between Brazil and the countries where
family business groups have affiliates as being a
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dependent variable. All the information relative
to the perception of the institutional quality of
the countries was collected from World Bank
data using the so-called Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI). The database offers a ranking
on the perceived institutional quality of countries.
Position of each nation corresponds to the
percentile at which the country is found among
215 others studied by the World Bank, on
a scale that varies from 0 to 100. Brazil has
usually featured between 40 and 60 over the
years of research, based on a series of assessment
dimensions. For example, if in a given year Brazil
features at 45.03, this means that the country
presents greater institutional development than
45.03% of the countries in the database. Thus,
by knowing the position of each country, it is
possible to calculate the distance between them
and Brazil. The formula is presented as follows:
Institutional Distance = [Ranking of host countries]
– [Brazil Ranking]
This simple subtraction is able to determine
the distance (in positions) between Brazil and the
other countries. Positive institutional distance
values indicate that the foreign affiliated firm
was set up in a country with institutions better
developed than the Brazilian ones. For example,
an institutional distance of +40.02 indicates that
the affiliated firm is hosted in country ranked
42.02% higher than Brazil indicting more
developed institutions. In the case of multiple
foreign affiliated firms established in the same year,
an average was used for the group’s institutional
distance in that year (adding the positions of the
countries and dividing the total by the number
of foreign affiliated firms).
WGIs indicators are composed by six
dimensions on the perception of institutional
quality. It is worth reiterating that all these
indicators are related to the country’s governance:
(i) Voice and Accountability: reflects the
perception of amplitude that a citizen
of the country has to participate in the
selection of his/her government, as well
as the freedom of expression, freedom of
association and freedom of the press;

(ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/
Terrorism: Political Stability and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions
of the likelihood of political instability
and/or politically motivated violence,
including terrorism;
(iii) Government Effectiveness: measures the
quality of public services, the quality of
the civil service and its independence
from political pressures, the quality of
policy formulation and implementation,
and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to its stated policies;
(iv) Regulatory Quality: captures perceptions
of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies
and regulations that permit and promote
private sector development.
(v) Rule of Law: This indicator measures the
extent to which individuals and firms
have confidence in and abide by the
rules of society; in particular, it measures
the functioning and independence of
the judiciary, including the police, the
protection of property rights, the quality
of contract enforcement, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence;
(vi) Control of Corruption: This indicator
measures the extent to which public power
is exercised for private grain, including
both petty and grand forms of corruption,
as well as “capture” of the state by elites
and private interests.
All these indicators were grouped in a
single factor, treated as the Mean Institutional
Distance, represented by the simple arithmetic
average of the values of each of the previous
indicators, per country and per year. Due to issues
of robustness, tests were also undertaken for each
of the indicators individually. For each of the six
indicators reported by the World Bank, Brazil
tends to occupy positions close to the middle,
in the period between 2000 and 2011. Below
Brazil are the countries with negative institutional
distances, ranked with less develop institutions,
and above Brazil are those nations with positive

335
Review of Business Management., São Paulo, Vol. 18, No. 61, p. 327-347, Jul./Sept. 2016

Marina A. B Gama / Jeferson Lana / Cyntia Calixto / Rodrigo Bandeira-de-Mello

institutional distances, a group composed by
more developed institutions. The fact that Brazil’s
indexes are close to the middle makes it an
especially interesting option for the application of
this study, as the number of countries with more
or less developed countries tends to be equivalent.
T h e m o d e l s i n t h i s a r t i c l e w e re
operationalized in accordance with each of the
WGIs, in order to determine whether the decision
to internationalize Brazilian family groups has
a relevant association on measuring the Mean
Institutional Distance. Model 1.1 to 1.6 consider
the Mean Institutional Distance as a dependent
variable. Models 2.1 to 2.6 consider each of
the six WGIs as dependent variables. Tests with
disaggregate dependent variables contribute to the
robustness of results found in models 1.1 to 1.6,
since they identify the aggregate and individual
effect found.

3.2.2 Independent variable
3.2.2.1 Type of affiliated firm in the host
country
Hypotheses 1 and 2 tests are related to
the type of affiliate firm installed in the host
country. As such, foreign affiliated firms were
characterized as: (i) manufacturing plants and (ii)
commercial offices. These variables were captured
through the corporate group websites, Orbis and
the Valor Grandes Grupos annual publication.
They were measured using the total number
of foreign affiliated firms that family business
groups establish in each category (manufacturing
plant and commercial office) per year. Through
this variable, it is possible to capture the affiliate
firm’s degree of resource commitment in its
internationalization.

3.2.2.2 Number of foreign affiliated firms
Through using the number of its
subsidiaries, it is possible to measure how the
internationalization process of a family business
group occurs. Data was thus collected on the
number of affiliated firms in different host

countries, using databases such as: (i) Orbis;
(ii) corporate group websites; (iii) statements
and publications by the firm. This variable was
employed in certain studies for example, in Dau
(2012), who used it to measure the number of
foreign subsidiaries held by the firms.
In total, data was obtained on 81 different
countries, representing 541 foreign affiliated
firms. According to the presented theoretical
model, it is expected that the number of foreign
affiliated firms linked to Brazilian family business
groups can explain greater institutional distances
adopted by new foreign affiliated firms.

3.2.3 Control variables
3.2.3.1 Diversification
Diversification was gauged using market
indicators from the Economatica database,
taking from it sectoral information with 55
levels of classification, used by the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
Each of the firms affiliated to the corporate
groups was analyzed, based on Valor Grandes
Grupos, and classified in 33 different sectors. The
diversification variable is considered one of the
leading characteristics of family business groups
and, as such, control of it is considered important
(Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Yafet,
2005; Costa et al. 2013).

3.2.3.2 Vertical integration
The same classification used by the IBGE
was used to calculate vertical integration followed
by the article by Khanna and Yafet (2005) and
also the proxy generated by the work of Costa,
Bandeira-de-Mello and Marcon (2013). To
achieve this, an intra-sectoral technical coefficient
matrix was used, representing production values
in Brazil, activity by activity. Using this table,
sectors were identified, along with which groups
belong to each sector (55 levels). The vertical
integration variable is considered one of the
leading characteristics of family business groups
and, as such, control of it is considered important
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(Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Yafet,
2005; Costa et al. 2013).

3.2.3.3 Revenue
In this variable, we considered the total
gross annual revenue for each family business
group. The Total Assets and Net Profit were
also tested, although these variables present
expressive multicollinearity with diversification.
Lastly, models were tested that use revenue as
representative of the size of the family business
group (variable transformed into a logarithm). This
variable is used to control the size of the family
business group and is commonly used in strategy
studies (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013).

3.3 Analysis procedures and model
specification
Using data descriptive statistics, we
assessed information such as: the main destination
for international expansion by business groups
and the type of affiliated firm established abroad.
This information was important to understand
these groups’ extension and the type of investment
they are looking for in those particular countries.
Following this phase, the correlation matrix was
studied for each of the main variables. Results
are presented in Table 2. The correlation matrix
helps prevent the presence of variables with
elevated correlation coefficients (>0.70), which
may lead to problems such as multicollinearity
and estimation errors.
Both hypotheses, 1 and 2, were tested
through the use of multiple linear regression,
in a non-observable and fixed effects model.
We understand that the choice seeks to control
non-observable variables and non-observable
heterogeneities (Allison, 2009), even though it is
not able to control the non-observable variables
that present change over time. As such, fixed effects
help control all the non-observable variables that
remain unchanged over time, such as the year of
establishment, sector and specific characteristics of
the firm. Multiple linear regression represents an
important tool for testing covariance among the

variables that, in some cases, may be interpreted
as causal effects. In the procedures and outline of
this study, we attempted to develop tests in a way
to optimize the possibility of finding causal effects
in the coefficients. However, it is understood
that these variables may present correlation
with the term of error, generated due problems
in endogeneity, for example. The final model is
presented by:

In this equation, means the Institutional
distance of the affiliated firm established in a
foreign country compared to Brazil (whether
the average or any of the six indicators that
comprise the WGI base). Models 1.1 to 1.6 use
the mean institutional distance as a dependent
variable, while models 2.1 to 2.6 use each of the
six variables measured by WGIs. The variable
represents the number of foreign affiliated firms
per family business group. The variable represents
the type of established affiliated firm and, lastly,
refers to the controls added to the models.
Robust coefficients for estimators were used
to control heteroscedasticity. Multicollinearity was
analyzed through the Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF) and cases in which the VIF exceeded a 5.00
value were eliminated. Finally, the residues of each
of the models were analyzed, seeking evidence of
non-linearity. All models were tested with the help
of Stata MP 13.1 software.

4 Results
Presenting a summarized look at the data,
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the
variables used in this article. Even though many
of the variables present 428 observations (8 groups
over 11 years), the models present a total 362
valid cases. This reduction is due to the lack of
information for certain years and family business
groups analyzed. It is worth noting that, among
all the institutional distance variables (average and
individually in the six indicators), the minimum
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value was -56, while the maximum was +61. As
previously reported, the outreach of distance in
the WGI variable ranges between 0 and 100.
However, in the majority of cases, Brazil presented
numbers close to 45 and 55. Thus, values found

between -56 and +61 were unsurprising. Table 1
presents longitudinal averages, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum values, asymmetry and
kurtosis of the variables discussed earlier.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Notes

Average

Standard
Dev.

Min

Max

Asymmetry

Kurtosis

(1)

Mean Institutional Distance

428

3.2590

13.8653

-45.6558

46.9529

0.8586

4.8704

(2)

Control of Corruption

428

2.1546

14.7693

-56.0976

47.3171

0.2844

5.1674

(3)

Rule of Law

428

5.2974

17.1597

-53.5545

61.7225

1.3256

5.1022

(4)

Regulatory Quality

428

2.7625

14.8447

-51.1962

45.0980

0.2717

5.3618

(5)

Government Effectiveness

428

4.8512

14.4165

-48.2927

48.5366

0.8078

5.2347

(6)

Political Stability

428

3.8014

14.7461

-52.4038

57.6923

1.1427

6.0575

(7)

Voice and Accountability

428

0.6867

14.2166

-56.8075

44.9519

-0.6368

7.6913

(8)

Num. of foreign affiliated firms.

428

0.8224

1.9897

0.0000

27.0000

7.0110

78.7697

(9)

Manufacturing

428

0.3621

1.1087

0.0000

13.0000

6.7140

64.4933

(10)

Commercial

428

0.1192

0.4665

0.0000

5.0000

5.5213

42.2839

(11)

Diversification

363

1.4973

0.7432

0.0000

3.1355

-0.3662

2.5519

(12)

Vertical Integration

363

0.2881

1.6039

-3.9391

5.3091

0.2101

3.3169

(13)

Revenue

377

8.6704

1.4091

5.7491

12.6321

0.3964

2.5667

Table 2 presents the correlation matrix.
Data shows a strong and significant correlation
among all the institutional distance variables
(Table 2, lines 1 to 7), with β > 0.66 (p<0.05),
which permits aggregate treatment. Following the
idea that the number of foreign affiliated firms
shows a consistent and positive relation with
institutional distance, the coefficients of Table 2
(line 8) present values that are in accordance with
expectations. The same consistency is found as to
commercial office-type affiliated firms, referring

to hypothesis 1 (Table 2 line 10). Institutional
distance associating manufacturing plant-type
affiliated firms did not present a significant initial
relationship (Table 2, Line 9: p<0.05). Both
diversification and vertical integration variables
presented a significant and negative correlation
(Table 2, line 12: p<0.05) and are positively
related to the revenue variable. Independent
variables do not present a relevant significant
relationship, which is an important condition in
avoiding multicollinearity.
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0,9412*

0,8711*

0,8377*

0,1533*

Regulatory Quality

Government
Effectiveness

Political Stability

Voice and
Accountability

Num. of foreign
affiliated firms.

Manufacturing

Commercial

Diversification

Vertical Integration

Revenue

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

Significance (*) p<0.05

0,9394*

Rule of Law

(3)

0,1127*

-0,0053

0,0929

0,2680*

-0,0104

0,9654*

0,9720*

Control of Corruption

(2)

1,0000

Mean Institutional
Distance

(1)

(1)

Table 2
Correlation Matrix

0,0761

-0,0402

0,0735

0,2015*

-0,0718

0,0714

0,8328*

0,8055*

0,8918*

0,9185*

0,9258*

1,0000

(2)

0,1314*

0,0195

0,1107*

0,3017*

0,0125

0,1985*

0,7407*

0,8287*

0,9196*

0,9075*

1,0000

(3)

0,1178*

-0,0041

0,0791

0,2679*

-0,0337

0,1223*

0,7188*

0,7363*

0,9083*

1,0000

(4)

0,1343*

0,0345

0,0937

0,2861*

0,0821

0,2405*

0,6969*

0,7826*

1,0000

(5)

0,1314*

0,0142

0,0998

0,2374*

0,0151

0,1936*

0,6610*

1,0000

(6)

0,0253

-0,0565

0,0515

0,1787*

-0,0651

0,0113

1,0000

(7)

0,1355*

0,1380*

0,1049*

0,3357*

0,6747*

1,0000

(8)

0,1237*

0,1778*

0,0273

0,1926*

1,0000

(9)

0,1190*

0,1553*

-0,0002

1,0000

(10)

0,4298*

-0,1804*

1,0000

(11)

0,5637*

1,0000

(12)

1,0000

(13)
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The hypotheses tested the relationship
between the commitment of resources by
family group-affiliated firms and the choice of
host country in terms of institutional distance.
To test these hypotheses, Table 3 used the
mean institutional distance as a dependent
variable, considering that aggregation of the six
WGIs in a single variable and then calculating
the actual distances between Brazil’s position

and the numbers presented by host nations.
Hypothesis 1 suggests that a commercial office
affiliated firm, which expends fewer resources,
is positively correlated to the choice of the host
country measured by institutional distance.
And hypothesis 2 states the contrary effect, with
regards to manufacturing-type affiliated firms,
which commit greater resources.

Table 3
Regression of models 1.1 to 1.6
Model
Num of foreign affiliated firms.

Mean Institutional Distance
Model 1.1

Model 1.4

Model 1.5

Model 1.6

0,616

0,769

1,103**

1,071**

(0,406)

(0,531)

(0,467)

(0,463)

-1,483*

-1,997***

-1,966***

Manufature

Model 1.2

Model 1.3

-0,167
(0,561)

Commercial

(0,855)

(0,711)

(0,713)

6,193***

5,709***

4,906**

4,973**

(1,781)

(1,877)

(2,038)

(2,054)

-0,200

0,0417

(2,671)

(2,516)

-0,361

-0,189

(0,906)

(0,926)

0,00587

0,00633

(0,0145)

(0,0147)

Diversification
Vertical Integration
Interaction # (Div#Int)
Revenue

-0,682
(1,160)

Constante

2,752***

3,320***

2,521***

2,484***

2,618

8,083

(0,334)

(0,203)

(0,212)

(0,286)

(4,258)

(11,30)

Notes

428

428

428

428

363

361

R-squared

0,008

0,000

0,041

0,049

0,049

0,049

Number of Groups

39

39

39

39

38

38

EF firms

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses, Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Hypothesis H1 is supported both by the
evidence noted in Model 1.3 (Table 3: β = 6.193,
p<0.01), when controlled for other variables (such
as the number of foreign affiliated firms and
revenue). The coefficient maintains its properties
with a slight downturn in its explanatory power
(Table 3. Model 1.6: β = 4.973, p<0.05).
Consequently, tests suggest that the less resource
commitment – opening a commercial office in

the host country – is positively associated to the
commercial distance between the home and host
countries, in support of hypothesis H1. In other
words, it suggests that Brazilian family business
groups internationalize to developed countries
by means of commercial offices, since risk and
investment are lower, and the institutional
environment is different from that of groupaffiliated firms.
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Hy p o t h e s i s H 2 a r g u e s t h a t t h e
higher commitment of resources – opening a
manufacturing plant in the host country – is
negatively associated to the institutional distance
between the home and host nations. In the case of
foreign affiliated firms, the simple linear regression
test found no statistical significance (Table 3.
Model 1.2: β = -0.167, p<0.05). However, when
control variables are used, the foreign affiliated
firms of the manufacturing plant type present
both negative and significant effects. Model 1.6:
β = -1.966, p<0.01; Table 3. Model 1.5: β = -1.997,
p<0.01). In short, these results suggest that, when
the institutional distance between Brazil and the
host country is negative (indicating countries
with less developed institutions), Brazilian family
business groups tend to internationalize through
affiliated manufacturing plants. These results
provide support to hypothesis H2. That is, there
is greater motivation to internationalize when host
country institutions are less developed than those
of the home country.
Furthermore, the variable for the number
of foreign affiliated firms presents a nonsignificant relation in the simple linear model
(Table 3. Model 1.1: β = 0.616, p<0.05). When
the diversification and revenue control variables
are used, the test reports a positive and significant
coefficient (Table 3. Model 1.6: β = 1.1071,
p<0.05). This result shows that the number of
foreign affiliated firms is positively related to the
institutional distance. In sum, an increase in the
number of foreign affiliated firms allows family
business groups to turn to countries with higher
institutional development than the home country.
To avoid problems arising from aggregate
variables, such as mean institutional distance used
in models 1.1 to 1.6, we opted for a series of
robustness tests using each of the six WGIs. Thus,
instead of using the mean institutional distances
among the rankings for each of the countries
and for each of the WGIs reported (Table 4). As
such, the tests related to the following models:
Control of Corruption (Model 2.1), Rule of Law
(Model 2.2), Regulatory Quality (Model 2.3),

Government Effectiveness (Model 2.4), Political
Stability (Model 2.5), Voice and Accountability
(Model 2.6). Testing the indicators individually
is an attempt to reinforce the explanatory power
of the model found. Once again, hypotheses 1
and 2 found support for the majority of cases
tested. Hypothesis H1 was fully supports (Table
4. Models 2.1 to 2.6), while hypothesis H2 found
support in four out of the six dimensions (Table
4. Models 2.1 to 2.3 and Model 2.5).
These results allowed us to advance with
the existing theory on the internationalization of
family business groups. Earlier evidence suggests
that group-affiliated firms invest more resources in
host countries than unaffiliated firms. Our results
showed that, depending on the institutional
distance between the home and host countries,
the commitment of invested resources may be
higher or lower.
Regarding the support of hypothesis
H1, we can infer that family business groups
internationalize with less resource commitment,
that is, through commercial offices, to countries
with higher institutional development than found
in the home country. This result complies with
the findings by Hernandez and Nieto (2015), who
affirmed that, the more positive the institutional
distance the higher the commitment in the host
country. However, the study by these authors
looked at firms unaffiliated to family business
groups. In the case of family business groups,
literature shows that, because affiliated firms
have deep-rooted characteristics from their home
countries (Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015) and the
majority of them are from countries that face
weak institutional development (Khanna &
Palepu, 2000b; Morck & Yeung, 2003), they run
a higher risk by committing resources, since they
have not developed sufficient competencies to deal
with more developed institutional environments.
Based on this result, we may corroborate what
was proposed by Kostova and Zaheer (1999).
According to the authors, the greater the
institutional distance between countries, the more
difficult it will be, for subsidiaries, to impress their
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legitimacy and transfer routines between the home
and host countries. Incompatibility between
family group-affiliated firms and countries with
more developed institutional environments

leads to greater risk and uncertainty for affiliates,
essentially resulting from a lack of knowledge
on how to cope within a different institutional
environment (Berry, 2006).

Table 4
Regression of models 2.1 to 2.6
Model
Num of foreign affiliated
firms.
Manufacture
Commercial
Diversification
Vertical Integration
Interaction # (Div#Int)
Revenue
Constant
Notes

R-squared
Number of Groups
EF firm

CofCor

RuOfLw

RegQlt

GofEff

PolSta

VoAcco

Model 2.1

Model 2.2

Model 2.3

Model 2.4

Model 2.5

Model 2.6

0.807

1.778**

1.033**

1.382**

1.442**

-0.0166

(0.491)

(0.663)

(0.488)

(0.590)

(0.643)

(0.526)

-2.320***

-2.894***

-2.319**

-1.465

-1.761**

-1.035

(0.785)

(0.921)

(0.873)

(0.953)

(0.833)

(0.800)

4.000**

6.552***

5.293**

4.415*

4.844**

4.735**

(1.926)

(2.110)

(2.579)

(2.273)

(2.070)

(2.057)

-0.768

-0.769

-0.820

1.645

-1.156

2.118

(2.773)

(2.772)

(2.398)

(2.113)

(2.899)

(3.394)

-0.521

-0.173

-0.391

-0.0217

-0.314

0.284

(1.051)

(1.043)

(0.999)

(0.872)

(0.957)

(1.227)

-0.00257

0.00803

0.00712

0.00760

0.0204

-0.00258

(0.0156)

(0.0140)

(0.0133)

(0.00945)

(0.0161)

(0.0249)

-0.789

-2.145

1.660

1.397

-0.995

-3.222**

(1.265)

(1.364)

(1.178)

(1.067)

(1.481)

(1.432)

9.890

23.49*

-11.01

-10.97

12.46

24.64*

(12.15)

(12.99)

(10.74)

(10.09)

(14.82)

(12.59)

361

361

361

361

361

361

0.034

0.073

0.050

0.062

0.059

0.037

38

38

38

38

38

38

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses, Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Through the support of hypothesis
H2, it is possible to infer that family business
groups internationalize with greater resource
commitment, that is, through manufacturing
plants, to countries with lower institutional
development than that found in the home country.
There is evidence that a negative institutional
distance between home and host countries leads
to foreign firms making a lesser commitment in
the host country (Hernandez & Nieto, 2015).
However, in the case of family business groups,
we may infer that the opposite is true, since the

groups are well-versed in unstable institutional
environments, as developed in countries with
weak institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000;
Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998). Guillén (2000) and
Khanna and Palepu (2000a) suggest that family
business groups could exist in the absence of
developed markets since, in essence, that happens
to give their affiliates the opportunity to operate in
imperfect markets in terms of capital, production,
work and technology. Markets with high levels of
corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) are subject
to unexpected changes in governmental policies

342
Review of Business Management., São Paulo, Vol. 18, No. 61, p. 327-347, Jul./Sept. 2016

Business groups internationalization: choosing a host country according to institutional distance

and government intervention in private business
(Slangen & Tulder, 2009). However, family
business groups have the competitive edge of
close political connections and, through these,
are able to influence home country’s policies
(Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Morck & Yeung,
2003; Morck, 2010; Schneider, 2009). Thus, a
good understanding of less developed institutions
increases the perception of difficulties in the host
country and aids the development of the affiliated
firm in that country (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010).
Consequentially, it is easier for group-affiliated
firms to access less institutionally developed
countries, since family business groups have the
necessary set of skills to deal with less developed
institutions (Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015). With
the lower risk of failure, they choose greater
investments.
Moreover, it was possible to verify the
knowledge developed over the years in relation
to the internationalization of firms affiliated to
family business groups. There is evidence showing
that, as family business groups increase their
number of foreign affiliates, there is a greater
trend for them to enter countries with a positive
institutional distance, in other words, more
developed than the home country. The results
found in this study corroborate to what was
proposed by Borda-Reyes (2012): the exchange
of experience and information among firms part
of family business groups stimulates learning
and reduces uncertainty in unexplored markets
(Borda-Reyes, 2012). Groups gain international
experience through their affiliated firms and this
ends up being an important resource in expanding
internationally (Yang, Jiang, Kang, & Ke, 2009).

decision to commit greater (manufacturing plant)
or lesser (commercial office) resources is related
to the institutional distance between the home
and host countries. Therefore, in international
expansion, the decision by affiliates to open a
commercial office is associated to the fact that
the host country presents a positive institutional
distance, when compared to the home country.
We believe this happens due to the fact that
the institutional characteristics of the home
country, in this case Brazil, are less developed
than the characteristics of the host country.
Thus, incompatibility with a more developed
institutional environment produces higher risk
and uncertainty for affiliates, which is essentially
the result of a lack of understanding when it comes
to dealing with more developed institutional
environments (Berry, 2006). As such, when
affiliated firms decide to expand internationally,
the investment takes the form of a manufacturing
plant and there is a trend to choose a host
country with less developed institutions than
those of the home country, that is, with negative
institutional distances. This is due to the groups
coping well with relatively unstable institutional
environments, since they develop essentially in
countries with weaker institutions (Ghemawat
& Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).
In addition, group-affiliated firms have deeprooted characteristics typical to the home market,
which bolsters their development in markets with
weaker institutions (Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015).
Lastly, when less developed institutions are better
understood, difficulties are reduced in the host
country, helping the affiliated firms to develop in
that country (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010).

5 Conclusion

5.1 Limitations and future studies

Our results contribute to extent the
knowledge on the literature about family business
groups. Previous studies showed that business
groups invest more resources in the host country,
when compared to group-unaffiliated firms
(Yaprak & Karademir, 2010). However, this
article challenged that notion and shows that the

This study was unsuccessful to cover
certain aspects that deserve attention in future
studies. For example, the fact that only 38 of
the top 200 Brazilian groups have international
operations. This issue can be addressed in both
theoretical and empirical terms. Furthermore, it
is important to analyze the time that lapses until
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a group-affiliated firm internationalizes, to thus
use the family business group’s date of foundation
versus the date of its first international activity.
Also, in to what extent political variables affect
the type of investment (commercial office and
manufacturing plant) in the host country, using
data collected on political connection and tests
conducted on measuring this variable in relation
to the commitment of resources and institutional
distance. Although this study contributed to
understand the internationalization of family
business groups, we believe that future studies
could enhance it through enlarge the database
including other countries, and providing a wider
analysis of the subject. Lastly, with a larger sample,
perhaps it would be possible to use more accurate
statistical methods, which can check the causality
among variables.

Chang, S.-J. (2006). Business groups in East Asia:
Post-crisis restructuring and new growth. Asia
Pacific Journal of Management, (23), 407–417.
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